Blame Attribution after Failures within Platform Ecosystems
ABSTRACT
Increasingly, new hardware and software are embedded within ecosystems that include a
platform and modules. Ideally these ecosystems perform reliably. However, if an ambiguously
sourced failure occurs within one of these ecosystems, users are left to distribute blame across
the various components of the ecosystem. The actual distribution of this blame, however, can be
difficult to predict. This study investigates attribution of blame and discontinuance
recommendations for ecosystem components after an ambiguously sourced failure. To extend
platform ecosystems and attribution theory, we conducted a scenario-based experiment
investigating the negative consequences of failure for platform and module components and the
contingent effects from design elements (border strength) and contextual factors (task goaldirectedness, disruption severity). Results demonstrated a diffusion of negative consequences for
failure across ecosystem components, but ecosystem modules (apps) received the majority of the
blame and highest discontinuance recommendations. High border strength shifted negative
consequences for failure away from the OS to the device. Low goal-directedness resulted in
users taking more of the blame for the failure, and higher disruption severity resulted in higher
discontinuance recommendations for the OS and device. Importantly, the amount of blame
attributed to one component in an ecosystem predicted discontinuance recommendations for
other components.
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Blame Attribution after Failures within Platform Ecosystems
INTRODUCTION
As platform-based ecosystems become increasingly common, owners of components of
those ecosystems are finding it important to understand how to manage their products within
these ecosystems successfully. Given the interdependency among components, the function of
any one component can be tied to the success and proper functioning of other components.
Similarly, and central to our study, failure on the part of one component may affect end-user
perceptions of other components. With this complex set of relationships and related risk in mind,
these ecosystems present a major challenge for a component’s sponsor to influence how the
sponsor is perceived.
Although the nature and consequences of failures vary, previous research suggests that
when a system fails, users search for someone or something to hold accountable for their
frustration and any related negative consequences [56]. When users have a clear idea regarding
responsibility for failure, this accountability is relatively straightforward to assess. However,
within a platform ecosystem, where interdependence is the norm and responsibility among
platform components may be unclear, understanding which component to hold accountable and
to what degree becomes more complicated as the source of failure may be ambiguous and/or
undiscernible by end users.
For example, consider a motorist using the Waze app running on the Android OS on an
HTC smartphone to navigate the streets in a foreign city. At a crucial intersection, the operation
of the system stops entirely, leaving the motorist confused as to where to go, or, worse, in a
dangerous traffic situation. Which component of the ecosystem does the motorist hold
accountable and consider discontinue using? Similarly, a user interacting with the Hulu
application on a Roku device may encounter sub-optimal functioning (e.g., content that should
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be available cannot be found). Again, which component of the ecosystem is held accountable and
how does that affect the user’s perception and continued use of that component?
In such situations, it is possible that multiple components are considered similarly
culpable, multiple components are considered culpable by the user but in unequal amounts, or a
single component could be considered the primary source of the problem. Within a complex
enivornment, however, this assessment may or may not correspond with actual culpability. Thus,
when platform ecosystem failures of an ambiguous nature occur, negative assessment assigned
for the failure may spread over ecosystem components regardless of whether or not they are
actually at fault.
In this study, we address two broad research issues. First, we examine how users
distribute blame among platform ecosystem components when they encounter a failure from an
ambiguous source. Second, we consider how components within such ecosystems may be able to
reduce the negative implications of such failures. In doing this, we use concepts from the
platform ecosystems and platform markets literature [17, 57] to help understand the tight
coupling within a platform ecosystem. We then integrate the concepts of digital borders and
border strength [14] with attribution theory [20] to theorize the manner in which users choose to
apportion blame after the occurrence of an ambiguous failure.
Using the context of the smartphone platform, we conducted a scenario-based experiment
in which we focused on how border strength, or the extent to which the boundaries around
objects (in this case, the device, its OS, and an application), affects user blame attribution and
discontinuance recommendations given an ambiguous failure. We also tested the effects of
different types of task (goal-directed vs. less goal-directed) being conducted when the failure
occurred and differences in the severity of the failure. Our findings show that while negative
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consequences for failure are shared across components, apps receive the majority of the blame
and the highest discontinuance recommendation. Increasing the border strength between
platform components, we found, shifted blame away from the OS and toward the device.
Importantly, the amount of blame attributed to one component in an ecosystem predicted
discontinuance recommendation for other components.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Failure and Attribution
While the complexity inherent in a platform ecosystem can create coordination and
governance challenges [e.g., 28, 51], users still expect technology systems to function properly
[56]. The context discussed here, of consumer-facing product-based ecosystems, aligns strongly
with the concept of product failures. In simple (non-ecosystem) products, these failures have
been found to result in negative consequences for the party deemed responsible, including
refund-seeking [20], negative brand evaluation [51], distrust toward related products [10], and
brand sabotage [29]. Therefore, understanding how the user identifies and attributes blame
within a complex ecosystem, where the source of the failure may be particularly unclear, is vital
to understanding how ecosystem failures affect user perceptions of the platform components’
sponsors.
According to attribution theory, identifying the party to be held responsible occurs based
on the user’s perception of situations and events [18]. In other words, an actor that purposefully
exerted effort resulting in a negative outcome accrues more negative sentiment (e.g., blame) than
one that was not capable of preventing the action from occurring. Therefore, for individuals to
make meaningful attributions, the intentionality behind actions leading to the negative event
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must be clear [50]. This intentionality has been further decomposed into attribution theory’s
three key dimensions: locus, controllability, and stability.
The locus of a failure captures the extent to which the action that caused the failure was
internal or external to the individual making the assessment [60].
Platform Ecosystems
Platform ecosystems are systems that require both a core platform as well as modules
built around the platform [58]. The platform supplies core functionality, such as access to input
and output devices, data processing, and accesses to sensors. Modules, on the other hand, extend
the functionality of the platform. Together, the platform and the modules that run on the platform
form the platform ecosystem [57].
Such platform ecosystems are becoming increasingly common. For example, consider the
streaming video ecosystem where the hardware device (e.g., a Roku box or properly-equipped
television) is the platform through which modules, in this case streaming service applications
(e.g., Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, YouTube), provide access to content. Video game consoles
provide another example, wherein the devices (e.g., the PlayStation or Xbox console) are the
platform through which game modules provide content and interactivity. As another example,
smartphones and mobile devices form a platform ecosystem, whereby the handset and operating
system together form the platform upon which applications (the modules) extend the
functionality.
This form of ecosystem is attractive to both module creators and end users in that it
facilitates easier adoption. For instance, a video game studio does not have to produce the system
itself, input/output devices, or other protocols, but instead can focus on developing the
entertainment content. Or, from the user perspective, the user does not have to purchase multiple
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devices or learn multiple interfaces to receive the benefits of differing applications.
Platform ecosystems can vary in complexity. In some cases, software alone can be
considered to comprise the platform. For instance, Microsoft Word facilitates access to many
different plug-ins (modules), while an internet browser can be considered the platform that
provides access to numerous website modules. However, platforms can also be considerably
more complex and consist of a combination of both hardware and software [57]. In such cases,
the software component of the platform runs on top of the hardware, forming a sort of “stack”
that together comprises the full platform. This more-complex form of ecosystem is common in
every day computing devices such as PCs (which require both the computer hardware as well as
an operating system) and smart phones (which require both a handset as well as an operating
system).
With this added complexity, the necessary coordination and governance to facilitate
proper function becomes more challenging [e.g., 28]. This may be particularly true for
application developers who develop for a given operating system (e.g., developing apps for
Android), but must also understand that there can be considerable variance with regard to the
hardware part of the platform — for instance, the devices may have various screen sizes,
memory capacity, and clock speeds. Further, in such complex platforms, both the software and
hardware components of the platform must work together successfully, again while considering
that the other components of the platform may vary (e.g., there are multiple versions of Android
that may eventually appear on a handset and there are multiple different handsets that run
Android).
Such interaction and interdependence are a key characteristics of platform ecosystems
[57]. Given the variability possible among components, there are increased opportunities for
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failures to occur due to the interdependence among the components. Even if one component fails
on its own, the performance of the other components is nevertheless tied to the failure of the one.
To date, however, antecedents and consequences of user perceptions specific to the components
in such ecosystems have not been widely considered despite the fact that qualities of a user’s
experience have been shown to be crucial to the formation of user attitudes toward technology
[e.g., 27, 37, 43].
Failure and Attribution
While the complexity inherent in a platform ecosystem can create challenges with
coordination and governance, users still expect these ecosystems to function properly. When the
system fails to perform to expectations, users will search for something to blame [56]. Various
forms of failure have long been studied within the information systems field. Scholars define a
system failure as any occurrence in which an information system fails to meet expectations or
requirements [e.g., 19, 38, 56]. Using this definition, much research has addressed organizationwide information systems that failed to satisfy their intended purpose to deliver value [3, 11, 15,
47]. Causes of failure include project escalation [30, 31], organization-system fit [55], and user
resistance [4, 23, 33]. While important as avenues of inquiry, these studies consider failure in a
way different from that proposed in our research. In particular, these studies focus on
organization-wide systems (vs. personal technology) and consider known sources of failure (vs.
ambiguous sources).
The failure of personal products used by individuals, however, has been studied at length
in the marketing field, where it has been termed product failure. These failures have been found
to result in negative consequences for the party responsible for the failure itself [5, 20, 39]. But
the assignment of blame has been shown to be contingent on characteristics of the failure and the
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entities (individuals, organizations) involved [50]. According to attribution theory, finding a
given party to be responsible for a product failure — in other words, blaming a given party —
occurs based on the user’s perception of situations and events [18]. What the user perceives in
terms of causality and responsibility for failure influences the user’s attribution of blame [50].
The party to whom blame is attributed has been found to suffer negative consequences as a
result, such as anger and refund-seeking [20], negative brand evaluation [51], distrust toward
related products [10], and brand sabotage [29].
Early theory on attribution focused on ordinary individuals understanding the meaning
behind the actions of others [22]. For individuals to make meaningful attributions about others’
dispositions based on observable actions, intentionality behind the actions must be clear [50]. In
other words, one who purposefully exerted effort resulting in harmful actions would accrue more
blame than one who was forced to perform harmful actions or unable to prevent harmful actions.
In subsequent research, intentionality necessary to attribute blame was further decomposed into
three characteristics: locus, controllability, and stability dimensions [60, 61].
In interpersonal attribution research, the locus of a failure captures whether the action that
caused failure was internal or external to the individual [60]. When considering product failures,
the locus has been conceptualized as an evaluation of direct culpability when a product fails to
provide its intended function and is estimated on a continuum between the product and the
consumer [20, 49]. When locus for a failure is estimated to be near the product, consumers
perceive that the product is directly responsible and therefore subject to more blame. For
example, failure experienced while using a product outside of its intended purpose (e.g., the car
stops running after the user continued driving despite seeing the gas gauge on empty) may result
in locus near the consumer and minimal blame attributed to the product. However, blame
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attributed to the product would be much higher for failure experienced during appropriate
product use (e.g., the car stops running despite normal maintenance and use).
The controllability dimension captures the degree to which failure was the result of
volitional or non-volitional action and is also traditionally conceptualized along a continuum
[20]. Controllability indicates the degree to which an entity has the capacity to carry out an
intended action. When controllability in product failure is high, individuals are likely to perceive
that the negative consequences of the failure could have been avoided. Therefore, blame for the
failure is also likely to be high. Alternatively, failure caused by unanticipated factors or lack of
ability may not accrue as much blame because there was little control over the nature of the
failure [60]. Although controllability often coincides with an internal locus, these dimensions can
differentially affect blame. For example, a product manufacturer may contractually control the
actions of a partner and therefore receive more blame for the partner’s actions in a failure even
though the partner is external. The extent to which a party is perceived to have had control over a
failure outcome is a key determinant of the product user’s adverse reaction [20].
Finally, the stability dimension is the degree to which the cause of the failure is
temporary (e.g., could fluctuate over time) or permanent (e.g., is relatively stable) [20].
Perceptions of stability provide individuals making attributions in response to failure an estimate
of how expected the failure was and how likely it will be in the future. For example, in the
course of making attributions, one might consider: Is the failure the result of repeated action that
is likely to continue or is it the result of transitory actions unlikely in the future? When the causes
for failure are relatively stable, blame attributions tend to be more severe.
Together, locus, controllability, and stability have successfully explained a host of
attributions that lay people make in response to observable actions of [32, 60]. However,

9

applying attributions within platform ecosystems, where components are interdependent,
presents a new challenge. The stability of each component within the ecosystem will likely
remain observable. For example, users will notice repeated failures involving the ecosystem
components. However, controllability and locus will likely be much more difficult to assess and
may be more fluid. For example, in ecosystems with multiple components, the locus can be
shared among the components (and the user). Additionally, the resources over which each
component has control in the ecosystem are often unclear and consumers might have difficulty
determining if a failure was avoidable. Given the interdependence in a platform ecosystem, this
fault ambiguity would be highly likely any time a failure occurs — even error messages
purporting to explain the failure may miss the mark or mislead the user, who has few resources
available (and likely lacks the time, patience, and necessity) to research root causes of
ambiguous failures.
HYPOTHESES AND MODEL
To explore ambiguously sourced failures in mobile platform ecosystems, we first
consider how locus, controllability, and stability can be used to attribute blame to ecosystem
components and ultimately affect discontinuance recommendations. We then introduce a new
characteristic, border strength, which we argue can alter the locus and controllability and thereby
affect blame attribution and discontinuance recommendations. Finally, we explore contextual
contingencies of disruption severity and goal-directedness and how they can influence blame and
discontinuance.
Platform Ecosystem Components
To understand how components within a platform ecosystem may be perceived
differently by users, it is important to revisit each component’s position in the ecosystem.
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Specifically, we draw a distinction between platforms (e.g., the device and OS working together)
and modules (e.g., apps) in the ecosystem. When individuals experience failure within a platform
ecosystem, they may not be aware of technical reason for the failure, thus possibly obscuring
actual locus and controllability. However, users are aware of their actions as they interact with
ecosystem components and these actions make apps the most likely target for blame attribution
and recommended discontinuance should a failure occur. Any ambiguously sourced failure will
occur during operation of an app, and, prior to that failure, users will have deliberately opened
and used the app. Therefore, the app and its potential role in the failure would be highly salient
and locus for the failure would likely be closer to the app. Further, the operating environment of
the platform is likely to be common and accessible to all developers who create apps. Therefore,
app developers will be attributed a greater degree of control over the unique experience their
apps provide. If failure occurs, users will likely contrast the failure with successful operation of
other apps in the same ecosystem (which ostensibly had similar control). Since platform
components provide similar resources to all apps, the increased locus and controllability for the
app would lead to higher blame attributed to app than to other components in the ecosystem
stack.
Finally, the purpose of platform components is to create a stable operating environment
that facilitates access to and management of the digital resources available in the platform [57].
In comparison to experience with apps, users likely will have had many more interactions with
platform components during which failure did not occur. In fact, one of the distinguishing
characteristics of platforms and an important reason why developers create apps for the platform
is stability [57]. With modules of the ecosystem being ascribed greater locus and controllability
and less stability than platform components, we anticipate greater blame and recommended
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discontinuance in response to ambiguous system failures. Therefore,
H1: Mobile platform modules (i.e., apps) will be attributed (a) greater blame and
(b) higher discontinuance recommendation after an ambiguously sourced system
failure than platform components (i.e., device, OS).
Border Strength
To consider how attributions of blame and discontinuance recommendations may be
altered by organizations supporting ecosystem components, we draw on the concept of the digital
border. A digital border is the specific boundary around a digital artifact such as a website or an
application [14]. The prominence of a digital border has predicted recognition of websites, with
consequences resulting from recognition (or non-recognition). These findings have particular
salience for branding on the Web; websites with higher borders are more likely recognized and
credited for their contributions to a task, potentially leading to greater user loyalty and brand
recognition. In the Web context, border recognition and attribution can be influenced by border
strength, or the extent to which a virtual location is indicated and reinforced (e.g., through
notifications, visual cues, or instructions) [14].
Given the findings regarding the effects of border strength in the Web context, we expect
that border strength will exhibit a similar effect within more complex mobile platform
ecosystems by making the potential locus of the failure more evident and raising awareness of
potential sources of controllability. Each component within a platform ecosystem, whether part
of the platform or module, has opportunity to better differentiate itself and, thus, strengthen the
border between itself and the remainder of the ecosystem. These borders, for instance, might be
strengthened through stronger, better-differentiated, and potentially interrupting design choices.
An application, for instance, can include a branded “splash screen” to raise the user’s awareness
regarding the app’s identity and features within the app may reinforce this identity. Similarly,
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through design choices, the OS and device may raise greater awareness of themselves. Such
designs have been found to strengthen borders within a multi-site Internet session context [14],
and we expect that stronger borders will play a similar role within the mobile platform
ecosystem. Strengthening of borders in this way will make apparent and distinguish the multiple
components that could appear monolithic to users. Increasing the prominence of ecosystem
components that could potentially be at fault should an failure occur will facilitate the generation
and direct perceptions of locus and controllability. For example, increasing border strength will
increase salience of the boundaries of controllability for each component. Strengthened borders
will also make more clear which components are in operation at the time of failure and, thus, will
likely alter perceptions of locus. Therefore,
H2: The border strength separating components within the mobile platform
ecosystem will significantly affect (a) the amount of blame assessed the
component and (b) the discontinuance recommendation of the component after an
ambiguously sourced system failure.
Goal-Directedness
Among contextual factors, the objective of the task being performed by a user interacting
with an ecosystem is critical to consider. A user may perceive the components differently
depending on the user’s specific activity: finding an answer to a closed-ended question,
researching a topic of interest to form an opinion, or passing time in pursuit of hedonic interests.
The range of potential activities that can be performed within a digital environment has been
described by several typologies. These include hedonic vs. instrumental/utilitarian [e.g., 9, 34,
37, 59], telic vs. paratelic [12], hedonic vs. intrinsic vs. extrinsic system proposed by Lowry et
al. [36], and the multi-dimensional task complexity spectrum originally introduced by Campbell
[7].
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In this work, we conceptualize task using a binary categorization of experiential vs. goaldirected [e.g., 25, 42, 44, 62]. This conceptualization is among the most commonly used and
permits exploration of task performance failure in some degree of structure. Further, the
conceptualization captures the greatest dichotomy among potential task types that are widely
performed using mobile platform ecosystems. Past research using this dichotomy has shown not
only its usefulness, but also its effects on user perceptions and intentions related to information
systems. Deng and Poole [12] found varying levels of pleasantness were perceived due to
interactions between a user’s meta-motivational state and the goal-directedness of a task.
Nadkarni and Gupta [42] found that goal-directedness affected user satisfaction with an online
system when considered along with the system’s visual complexity. Finally, Novak et al. [44]
found that goal-directedness affected the amount of flow (immersion in an activity) experienced
by Web users.
In a similar vein, we anticipate that goal-directedness of a task will also alter the blame
and discontinuance recommendations for ecosystem components after an ambiguously sourced
failure. Blame occurs in response to actions for which individuals will suffer negative
consequences [50]. In contrast to experiential tasks, when failure occurs during goal-directed
tasks users are denied achieving a defined their aims and must suffer anticipated consequences.
Therefore, when goal-directedness is high, blame attributions based on locus, controllability, and
stability are likely to be stronger. For example, in a focused task with a concrete objective, users
will be more likely to take note of obstacles and who placed them (i.e., locus, controllability) that
prevent them from reaching their objectives. If failure within a platform ecosystem makes goal
achievement impossible, users will likely respond negatively by attributing blame. In contrast,
users engaged in more experiential tasks would be less likely to note the failure as an obstacle
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and be more likely to simply move on to other tasks. Therefore,
H3: The goal-directedness of the interaction with a mobile platform ecosystem
will significantly affect (a) the amount of blame assessed the component and (b)
the recommended discontinuance of the component after an ambiguously sourced
system failure.
Disruption Severity
Ecosystem failures can result in a variety of consequences for the user. For example,
some failures may cost the user only a few moments of inconvenience, while others may require
considerably more time and effort to resolve. Indeed, Galletta et al. [21] found that delay within
a website context was a cost which negatively impacted a user’s future intentions. Other studies
have yielded similar findings, where perceived and actual delays negatively impacted the quality
of an experience [16, 54], increased user frustration [8, 48], and hampered system success [45].
As the negative consequences for failure increase we expect to see blame attributions as the
result of locus, controllability, and reliability increase. These attributions should also be evident
in discontinuance recommendations. Therefore,
H4: The disruption severity caused by an ambiguously sourced system failure will
(a) increase the amount of blame assessed to components of a mobile platform
ecosystem and (b) increase the recommended discontinuance of components.
Blame Attribution and Continuance
Finally, within the context of a user’s interaction with information technology, we expect
blame resulting from failure within a mobile platform ecosystem to have important
consequences. Indeed, in the ecommerce context and as noted by Tan et al. [56], service failures
result in negative consequences for the sites where the failures transpired. A substantial literature
has found significant relationships between negative perceptions of a technology and future
intentions with regard to that technology [e.g., 27, 37, 43]. We expect a similar relationship to
emerge with mobile platform ecosystems. Therefore:
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H5: The greater the blame assessed a mobile platform ecosystem component after
an ambiguously sourced system failure, the greater the recommended
discontinuance of that component.
Model
As described above, our exploration consists of the evaluation of the model shown in
Figure 1. We examined blame attribution to and discontinuance recommendations for the device,
OS, and app. Consistent with our conceptualization of blame, we also captured blame of self.

Border Strength

H2a

Blame:

H3a
H4a

Goal-Directedness

Self
Device
OS
App

H1a

H5

H2b
Disruption Severity

H3b
H4b

Discontinue:

Device
OS
App

H1b

Figure 1. Experimental model for blame and discontinuance
METHOD
To test our hypotheses, we conducted two scenario-based experiments within the mobile
platform ecosystem. The first experiment (n = 142) confirmed how attributions are made after
failures and explored effects of border strength on discontinuance recommendations for platform
components (H1, H2). The second experiment (n = 367) revisited border strength and examined
additional effects from goal-directedness and disruption severity on discontinuance (H1-H4).
Four pilot studies, including over 500 participants, tested the scenarios and measurement prior to
the main experiments. Data were collected in a single session for each participant via the
Qualtrics survey system. After providing consent, participants were randomly assigned a
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condition and were asked to complete a pre-survey including control variables. They were then
presented a multi-part scenario (customized by condition) in which they had been given a
smartphone (device and OS) with an app that they were expected to use for a new job. While
using the smartphone and app, a failure occurred which resulted in the temporary inoperability of
the smartphone. After finishing the scenario and completing attention checks, participants then
answered questions about components in the mobile platform ecosystem. Appendix A contains
the items that were used in the experiments. Appendix B includes the full text and treatment
conditions in the scenarios.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 checked manipulations, revealed attributions in response to failure, and
examined the effects of border strength (weak border vs. strong border-unfamiliar app developer
vs. strong border-familiar app developer) on discontinuance recommendations (H1, H2).
Participants
Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service, which
has been found to provide participants similar in quality to other frequently-used sources, such as
university students and commercial panel recruiting services [e.g., 6, 35, 53]. Participation was
limited to United States residents who had completed more than 100 MTurk assignments, but
fewer than 1,000 [46]. Participants were compensated $1.00 to complete the experiment. We
sourced 200 participants, but 58 participants failed attention checks and comprehension tests.
Therefore, our final sample included 142 participants. The mean age of participants was 33.8
(SD = 10.7); 60.0% were female, and 59.1% completed at least a bachelor's degree. Every
participant reported owning a smartphone and 96.5% of participants reported using their
smartphones several times each day.
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Independent Variables
Border strength was manipulated in the beginning of the scenario. Participants were
given some background about a job they had just started and the expectation of using a companyassigned smartphone and app. As a robustness check for border strength, we tested both familiar
and unfamiliar app developers. Teleduke is a fictitious company created for this experiment and
Oracle is an established company that is widely known. In the strong borders conditions the
brands of the device, OS, and app were named in the scenario, which read:
Imagine you have started a job for a new company working in the service
department. The company has given you a new smartphone that they expect you to
use as your primary mobile device. This particular smartphone is made by
Motorola and is the Moto E model. The phone uses the Android operating system
developed by Google (version 4.4). Your company has also required you to install
and use a third-party app called ComMentor from the Google Play store. This
app allows you to monitor and collect data regarding customer comments and
was developed by a company called [Teleduke (Unfamiliar app developer)/
Oracle (Familiar app developer)].
The identity of these brands was then reinforced through attention-check questions,
which asked participants to name the smartphone manufacturer, the operating system, and the
name of the app developer (only responses where the participant correctly answered these
questions were included in the analysis). In the weak borders condition, the background omitted
brand names and was followed by questions asking participants to name the department where
they worked, where the company’s headquarters was located, as well as the kind of building in
which the job took place.
Dependent and Control Variables
Following the scenario, participants were given the following prompt:
Your company is considering making changes to the smartphone, smartphone
operating system, and the app that you used in the scenario. This change would
affect you and all other employees in your department. Each of these components
could be changed separately (i.e., the company could change smartphone devices,
but retain the same operating system and app).
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Following this prompt, participants were asked to recommend whether the company should
change the device, the OS, and the app. This recommendation was on a seven-point scale,
ranging from strongly recommend against (changing the component) to strongly recommend.
Our investigation also considered several control variables that were included based on
past literature indicating that they may affect user attribution of failure with an ambiguous source
as well as discontinuance recommendation. Since we used actual brands, we captured attitudes
about those brands. Prior to starting the scenario, participants provided their impressions of the
smartphone manufacturer, OS, and app brands that would be referenced in the scenario to come.
Impressions were captured on a seven-point scale ranging from very negative to very positive
[e.g., 13]. The four scenario brands were randomly mixed with eight additional brands to
ameliorate priming effects for the scenario brands. Participants then completed scales for
propensity to blame, mobile device self-efficacy [1, 41], product involvement [63], and
normative and informational susceptibility to interpersonal influence (SII) [2].
Results
To check the theoretical rationale for how borders function to alter attributions following
ambiguous failure, we first examined perceptions of locus, controllability, and stability (see
Table 1). 1 In the rationale for H1, we argued that perceptions of stability would differ between
modules (i.e., app) and the platform (e.g., OS, device). Consistent with this argument, withinsubjects comparisons from a repeated analysis of variance (ANOVA) demonstrated differences
in the level of stability attributed to the app, OS, and device, F(2, 280) = 4.126, p = .017.
Furthermore, in the rationale for H2, we argued that making borders salient within the platform
Prior to reporting discontinuance recommendations, participants rated the app, OS, and device using the following
items taken from <<CITE>>. “The following questions concern the [app, OS, device]. The problem you read about
above is something…” Locus: “That reflects an aspect about the [app, OS, device]” … “That reflects something
about the situation”; Controllability: “That the [app, OS, device] can regulate” … “That the [app, OS, device] cannot
regulate”; Stability: “That is stable over time” … “That varies over time”. All items were on a 7-pt scale.
1
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ecosystem would alter locus and controllability. Consistent with this argument, between-subjects
comparisons from a repeated ANOVA demonstrated that border strength significantly affected
locus, F(2, 139) = 4.304, p = .015. However, border strength did not affect controllability, F(2,
139) = 1.605, p = .205. Therefore, effects from border strength were associated with locus, not
controllability.

Border
Conditions
Weak Border

Attributions

Strong Border –
Teleduke
Strong Border –
Oracle

Device Mean (SD)

Stability
Locus
Controllability
Stability
Locus
Controllability
Stability
Locus
Controllability

4.93 (1.52)
3.90 (1.84)
3.98 (1.59)
4.69 (1.49)
4.73 (1.62)
4.49 (1.67)
5.15 (1.33)
4.93 (1.61)
4.33 (1.78)

Component
OS Mean (SD)
4.63 (1.43)
3.71 (1.42)
3.22 (1.28)
4.78 (1.45)
4.58 (1.64)
4.00 (1.82)
4.80 (1.52)
3.89 (1.72)
3.74 (1.72)

Table 1. Experiment 1 stability, locus, and controllability mean values.

App Mean (SD)
5.24 (1.37)
2.71 (1.42)
3.17 (1.55)
5.24 (1.24)
2.75 (1.60)
2.84 (1.63)
4.98 (1.42)
2.76 (1.61)
3.13 (1.71)

Following checks of attribution, we then examined our hypotheses by testing effects of
borders on discontinuance. Means of discontinuance recommendations are shown in Table 2. To
test H1, we performed a repeated ANOVA to compare the discontinuance recommendations for
the app, OS, and device. The repeated ANOVA accounted for the nonindependence of
observations and demonstrated significant differences between ecosystem components, F(2, 278)
= 38.342, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.22. In support of H1, post-hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction for
repeated tests demonstrated that discontinuance recommendations were higher for the app than
they were for the OS and device (both at p < .001).
Treatment

Conditions

N
46
55

Mean Device
Discontinuance
(SD)
3.89 (1.55)
4.65 (1.61)

Mean OS
Discontinuance
(SD)
4.41 (1.57)
4.69 (1.67)

Mean App
Discontinuance
(SD)
5.76 (1.10)
5.84 (1.21)

Borders

Weak Border
Strong Border –
Teleduke
Strong Border –
Oracle

41

4.56 (1.52)

5.17 (1.36)

5.51 (1.05)
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Total

143

4.38 (1.59)

4.74 (1.57)

5.72 (1.13)

Table 2. Experiment 1 discontinuance recommendation model mean values.

To test H2, we performed a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with
border strength as the independent variable, discontinuance recommendations for each
component as dependent variables, and control variables as covariates. Since discontinuance
recommendations among ecosystem components are conceptually related, MANCOVAs are
appropriate analysis techniques [40]. The complete results from the MANCOVA are presented in
Appendix C. Multivariate tests, F(6, 258) = 2.083, p = .056, indicated a significant effect for
border strength. Consistent with H2, follow up univariate tests demonstrated significant effects
from borders on continuance recommendations for the OS, F(2, 130) = 4.027, p = .020, ηp2 =
0.06, and for the device, F(2, 130) = 3.127, p = .047, ηp2 = 0.05. Post hoc tests with a Bonferroni
correction revealed that strong borders resulted in higher discontinuance recommendations the
OS (Strong Border-Oracle compared with Weak Boarder: p = .014) and device (strong borderteleduke compared with weak boarder: p = .057).
Several covariates demonstrated a significant influence on the dependent variables;
therefore, abbreviated significant results are reported next. Brand impressions of the device (p =
.017) and the app developer (Teleduke: p = .008) influenced discontinuance of the app.
Propensity to blame (p = .021), product involvement (p = .036), and SII (normative) (p = .044)
influenced discontinuance of the OS. Full results are reported in Appendix C.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 expanded on Experiment 1 and tested H1 – H4 and followed a 3 (border
strength: weak border vs. strong border-teleduke vs. strong border-oracle) × 2 (goal-directedness:
experiential vs. goal-directed) × 2 (disruption severity: low vs. high) factorial design
Participants
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Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service. We
sourced 480 participants via MTurk with the same restrictions and incentive as in Experiment 1.
Removing participants who did not complete the experiment and those who failed these attention
checks resulted in n = 367, with 29 or more participants in each cell. The mean age of
participants was 33.2 (SD = 8.8), 61.3% were female, and 52.4% completed at least a bachelor's
degree. Every participant reported owning a smartphone and 94.0% of participants reported
using their smartphones several times each day.
Independent Variables
In Experiment 2, border strength was manipulated in the same manner as in Experiment 1
and participants who failed to correctly identify the app developer, OS developer, or device
manufacturer were excluded. Following border strength, goal-directedness was manipulated and
included two conditions: goal-directed or experiential [42, 44]. In the goal-directed condition, the
scenario continued by describing a circumstance in which the participant was asked to use the
smartphone and app to complete a goal-directed task (finding examples of an employee’s work
as part of an award nomination process as in Experiment 1). In the experiential condition, the
scenario continued by describing a circumstance in which the participant looked for entertaining
exchanges between customers and support employees. Participants in the goal-directed condition
reported that in the scenario they had more of a distinct, identifiable purpose (M = 6.27, SD =
.91; t(362) = 15.20, p < 0.001) and looked up more specific information (M = 6.31, SD = .96;
t(365) = 16.15, p < 0.001) than participants in the experiential condition (purpose M = 4.24, SD =
1.56; specific information M = 4.03, SD = 1.65). 2 These significant differences indicated a
successful manipulation for goal-directedness.
Manipulation check items for goal-directedness and disruption severity were measured on a 7-point Likert type
scale with Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree as endpoints.
2
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Lastly, participants were also assigned to either a low or high disruption severity
condition. In both conditions, the scenario described an ambiguous failure in the mobile platform
ecosystem during which the app, OS, and device froze and became unresponsive during the task.
In the low disruption severity condition, participants were told that after freezing, they restarted
the smartphone and it became operable again. In the high disruption severity condition, however,
participants were told:
You cannot get the phone to turn off and restart. After taking the phone to your
company’s IT group, it takes three days to get your phone back in working order,
during which time you miss several important calls from your boss, who is out of
the country.
Indicating a successful manipulation, participants in the high disruption severity
condition reported their disruption as more severe (M = 5.75, SD = 1.15; t(365) = 13.15, p <
0.001) and serious (M = 5.88, SD = 1.18; t(365) = 13.00, p < 0.001) than participants in the low
disruption condition (severe M = 3.82, SD = 1.61; serious M = 3.95, SD = 1.63).
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables and control variables in Experiment 2 mirrored those from
Experiment 1 and included continuance recommendations as the dependent variable and attitudes
about the smartphone manufacturer, OS, and app brands, propensity to blame, mobile device
self-efficacy [1, 41], product involvement [63], and normative and informational SII [2]
comprised the control variables.
Analysis
The analysis approach for Experiment 2 mirror the approach for Experiment 1.
Descriptive statistics discontinuance recommendations are shown in Table 3.
Treatment

Conditions

n

Mean Device
Discontinuance
(SD)

Mean OS
Discontinuance
(SD)

Mean App
Discontinuance
(SD)
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Borders

GoalDirectedness
Disruption
Severity
Total

Weak Border
Strong Border
– Teleduke
Strong Border
– Oracle
Experiential
Goal-Directed
Low
High

123
123

4.04 (1.339)
4.64 (1.466)

4.48 (1.276)
4.07 (1.524)

5.59 (1.145)
5.60 (1.122)

121

4.53 (1.461)

4.28 (1.629)

5.49 (1.239)

184
183
182
185
367

4.33 (1.340)
4.48 (1.540)
4.30 (1.411)
4.50 (1.471)
4.40 (1.443)

4.36 (1.434)
4.19 (1.541)
4.18 (1.462)
4.37 (1.513)
4.28 (1.489)

5.56 (1.172)
5.56 (1.165)
5.34 (1.289)
5.77 (.990)
5.56 (1.167)

Table 3. Experiment 2 discontinuance recommendation model mean values.
To test H1, we conducted a repeated ANOVA comparing the discontinuance

recommendations among the three components (device, OS, and app). Results demonstrated that,
like in Experiment 1, discontinuance recommendations in Experiment 2 also differed across
components, F(2, 365) = 113.469, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.38. Post-hoc tests with a Bonferroni
correction indicated that discontinuance recommendations for device and OS did not differ from
each other (p = .480). However, as shown by the total means in Table 2, discontinuance
recommendations for the app were higher than recommendations for the device (p < .001) and
for the OS (p < .001). These findings replicate support for H1.
To test H2, H3, and H4, a MANCOVA was performed using border strength, goaldirectedness, and disruption severity as independent variables, discontinuance recommendations
for the device, OS, and app as the dependent variables, and control variables as covariates. The
complete results from the both MANCOVAs are presented in Appendix C.
Multivariate tests indicated significant main effects for border strength, F(6, 690) =
3.745, p = .001, and for disruption severity, F(3, 344) = 3.897, p = .009. The lack of significant
effects from goal-directedness failed to support H3. Univariate tests indicated a significant main
effect of border strength on recommended discontinuance for the manufacturer, F(2, 346) =
4.264, p = .015, ηp2 = 0.02, and for the OS, F(2, 346) = 3.770, p = .024, ηp2 = 0.02. These
findings are consistent with H2. Additionally, there was a significant main effect of disruption
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severity on discontinuance recommendations for the app, F(1, 346) = 10.537, p = .001, ηp2 =
0.03. Post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction revealed that those in the weak border condition
reported lower manufacturer discontinuance recommendations than those in both strong border
conditions (Oracle: p = .054; Teleduke: p = .023). But, those in the strong border Teleduke
condition reported lower OS discontinuance recommendations than those in the low border
condition (p = .019). Finally, consistent with H4, those in the severe disruption condition
reported higher discontinuance recommendations for the app (p = .001).
Abbreviated significance tests are reported for significant covariates. Higher impressions
of Android decreased the discontinuance recommendations for the OS (p = .001). SII
(informational) increased the discontinuance recommendations for manufacturer (p = .036) and
OS (p = .011). Full results are reported in Appendix C.
DISCUSSION
The objective of this paper was to explore the attribution of responsibility after an
ambiguous failure in a platform ecosystem as well as understand the consequences from such
attributions. The results (see Table <<REF>>) provide several important theoretical and practical
advances regarding attribution and discontinuance recommendations. We discuss each below.
Hypotheses
H1: Mobile platform modules (i.e., apps) will be attributed
higher discontinuance recommendation after an ambiguously
sourced system failure than platform components (i.e.,
device, OS).
H2: The border strength separating components within the
mobile platform ecosystem will significantly affect the
discontinuance recommendation of the component after an
ambiguously sourced system failure.
H3: The goal-directedness of the interaction with a mobile
platform ecosystem will significantly affect the recommended
discontinuance of the component after an ambiguously
sourced system failure.
H4: The disruption severity caused by an ambiguously
sourced system failure will increase the recommended

Experiment 1
Results
Supported

Experiment 2
Results
Supported

Supported

Supported

-

Not Supported

-

Supported
25

discontinuance of components.

Contributions to Theory
First among the contributions of this paper is the formalization of ambiguous failures in
platform ecosystems. Although previous research has explored consequences related to IT
systems failure [e.g., 26, 56], none to our knowledge has explored the effects of failure in
platforms where the source of the failure is unclear. Platforms and modules are designed to
integrate seamlessly, but it is critical to understand the consequences should integration fail.
Platform ecosystems are becoming increasingly prevalent for both consumers and organizations
[57] . More and more, companies must compete within the context of their platform membership
[58]. With the interconnectedness of components within such an ecosystem, responsibility for
ecosystem function is distributed across multiple components, including both platform
components and modules. Prior work [24] has treated in isolation perceptions of the form and
function of various components in digital ecosystems. Our study provides evidence that a focus
on a single ecosystem component may neglect critical aspects regarding how consumers actually
use and experience mobile platform ecosystems.
Second, with the prevalence of mobile platform ecosystems and their attempts at tight
integration, ambiguous failure of one or more components of the ecosystem is likely to be a
recurring issue. When failures arise, how do users attribute responsibility? Both Experiment 1
and Experiment 2 demonstrated that when ecosystem failure occurs, the app was recommended
much more strongly than other platform components for discontinuance. Yet, this finding was
also was intriguing because the app was also attributed much less locus and controllability than
the OS or device (see Table 1). According to attribution theory, greater locus and controllability
are typically needed for assignment of greater responsibility. Yet, this was not the case with
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ambiguous failure within platform ecosystems. Instead, the last dimension of attribution theory
offers clues to how responsibility is assigned to the app. Users perceived the app as less stable
than other components in the ecosystem and on this basis, were more likely to assign greater
responsibility for failure. The implications of this finding suggest that the three dimensions of
attribution theory are not equally weighted when determining fault for ambiguous ecosystem
failure. In this case, stability may be more important than locus or controllability.
Although the app bears the brunt of negative consequences during ecosystem failure, we
show that the OS and device are not absolved of culpability. Results suggest that following
ambiguous failure, multiple parties share in the perceived responsibility. Across conditions,
discontinuance recommendations were at or above the midpoint for all ecosystem components,
implying that failure of the ecosystem, regardless of the component originating the failure, will
have a negative impact on all components in the ecosystem. These findings suggest that digital
ecosystems may often be at the mercy of the weakest component used by the consumer.
Third, we find that design elements (e.g., borders) and contextual factors (e.g., disruption
severity) are important contingencies in the attribution of responsibility for failure subsequent
discontinuance recommendations. Although the app remained the most likely to be discontinued
regardless of border condition, results of both experiments demonstrated that borders altered
discontinuance recommendations for the digital platform itself (not ecosystem modules). In
Experiment 1, salient borders increased discontinuance for the OS and device. Experiment 2
replicated the findings for the device, but border salience was shown to decrease discontinuance
for the OS. These findings support the idea that the digital platform (e.g., OS, device) is most
susceptible to the effects of borders and that the device manufacturer faces greater negative
consequences from failure when borders are salient. However, the effects of borders for the OS
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are complex and warrant additional attention. Results regarding how attributions are made may
offer clues to a potential explanation: Experiment 1 demonstrated that the effect of borders was
most closely associated with locus (and not controllability). In other words, the effect of borders
appears to operate more through estimates of direct culpability and less through estimates of the
capacity and intention to avoid failure. Other researchers have argued that the OS is the central
component of platform [57] and its boundaries may be obscured. Positioning of the locus in
response to failure may be a more difficult (and ambiguous) task for the OS than for the other
components in an ecosystem, but this speculation requires additional research.
Among the two contextual factors we examined, effects from disruption severity were
more pronounced. We uncovered no effects on discontinuance recommendations from goaldirectedness, which suggests individuals are likely to harbor similar attitudes about
discontinuance regardless of the task they were performing at the time of failure. Consistent with
our expectations, disruption severity increased discontinuance recommendations for the app, but
the effect did not spread to the OS or device. This finding implies that, in addition to the
tendency for the app to be most likely discontinued following failure, the consequences from
severity of the disruption (as tested here) also fall disproportionately on the app.
Implications for Practice
Should ambiguous failure of a mobile platform ecosystem occur, blame is shared among
all components of the ecosystem. A better integrated system that experiences fewer faults,
therefore, benefits all members of the ecosystem. This finding supports a tighter integration
among all components of the stack to create a more functionally problem-free system where
good apps run confidently on an easy-to-develop-for OS that is then run on hardware devices
well equipped to handle the requirements of both the OS and the apps that may be available for
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it. In fact, some operating systems may already be taking pains to ensure this occurs, for instance
Microsoft has reportedly created specific hooks within its Windows PC OS to facilitate
successful interaction with certain software and hardware vendor products [52].
When ambiguous failures arise, app developers should be aware that their products are
most likely to be held responsible and other components of the ecosystem (e.g., OS and device)
are more insulated from responsibility. Apps are perceived as less stable compared to other
components in the ecosystem and the worse the disruption, the greater the likelihood users will
opt to discontinue using the app. Therefore, in the eyes of users, app developers are likely to bear
the largest portion of responsibility for delivering a problem-free experience. As the level of
attributed responsibility grows, so too will a disproportionate incentive for tight and robust
integration between apps and platform components. Fortunately for app developers, the type of
app or what users are doing with the app (experiential or goal-directed) seems to matter less than
other failure contingencies.
Finally, design decisions that make borders between ecosystem components salient alter
discontinuance recommendations. Salient borders prior to failure will harm attitudes toward the
device, but its effects are mixed toward the OS. Thus, device manufacturers and OS developers
may be incentivized to obscure borders in situations where probability of failure is high. App
developers, on the other hand, may be incentivized to promote borders to differentiate
themselves from other app developers and other components in the ecosystem, but also to spread
responsibility should failure occur.
Limitations and Future Research
There are some important limitations to our findings. First, we chose one of several
ecosystems (mobile) and taxonomies for understanding goal-directedness. While this enabled us
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to ground our scenarios in familiar contexts and have distinct differentiation between
experimental conditions, other ecosystems and taxonomies could present different outcomes in
response to failure. Therefore, replication with other ecosystems and task taxonomies is
recommended. Additionally, while we found significant main effects for border strength, our
manipulation was simplified as a result of the scenario-based data collection approach. Other,
real-world attempts at creating border strength may have amplified effects on the results and
should be a subject for future inquiry. Finally, our data collection was based entirely on a
scenario-based experiment in which participants had to pretend to have participated in the events
described to them. While we found significant results, we expect that these results were
dampened by the requirement to imagine the experience. Future research may find even more
pronounced results from an experimental or archival dataset based on actual failure experienced
by participants.
Conclusion
Platform ecosystems continue to grow in prominence both for organizations and
consumers. The markets created by these ecosystems also continue to grow, despite possible
complications caused by an increased level of interconnectedness among components within
these systems. Our study has made significant contributions to the understanding of such
systems, particularly when ambiguous failures occur within them. Further, we have uncovered
interesting results regarding the nature of user perceptions of components within mobile platform
ecosystems in the context of a system failure. As such ecosystems proliferate, the relevance and
importance of this research for component creators and consumers will increase.
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